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Inside Oligarchs versus Outside India:  
Technical (non)progress and environmental effects in Post-Soviet Steel 
Manuela Troschke and Florian Wittmann 
The recent case of the Ilva Steelworks in Italy demonstrates that outdated technology in steel production can persist 
and respective environmental damage can occur if economic and political interests that stick to an overcome 
developmental model collude. Steel played also a prominent role for economic development of the Soviet Union, but 
over decades under the plan mechanism a pronounced technological backwardness of the sector evolved. Despite 
privatization, trade liberalization and rising prices for input goods since transition, backwardness persists till now 
and environmental damage caused by the sector is a serious concern. Our article examines technical (non)progress 
in the steel sector of Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan and looks at the explanatory factors for backwardness, with a 
special focus on ownership. To overcome the locked-in situation, we propose that EU anti-dumping investigations 
and trade agreements should take into account a broader range of potential subsidies and include environmental 
factors alike. 
 
 
The role of Steel in CIS countries 
Steel production had been a main driver of economic de-
velopment and industrialization in the Soviet Union. It con-
tributed substantially to “overtaking the west” and fuelled 
societal change towards a post-feudal industrial society. 
Among CIS states, the three largest producers of (crude) 
steel are Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia, while Russia 
and Ukraine are ranked among the ten largest steel-
producing countries in 2012. Soviet steel enterprises 
dominated the economic (and partly also the political) 
development of these countries. Historically they consti-
tuted the industrial base of a country, provided basic input 
goods for many other sectors, with the defence industry 
playing a prominent role. Steel production till nowadays is 
a backbone of the three economies. Despite a certain 
decline within the last decade, the share of steel in indus-
trial production accounted for 12% (Russia), 14% (Ka-
zakhstan) and 19% (Ukraine) according to official statistics 
in 2011. Steel exports of the oil and gas exporting nations 
in the same year contributed 5% (Russia) and 7% (Ka-
zakhstan) but 27% for Ukraine to total exports. 
 
 
Figure 1: Producers of crude steel among CIS countries 
in thsd. tons (2011) 
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Steel plants all over the world are predominantly large – 
the 15 largest producers account for one third of world 
steel production. Also in CIS, the steel market is domi-
nated by large enterprises. After the collapse of com-
munism, they all had been privatized (and partly even 
re-privatized) in the early years of transition. The Rus-
sian market is concentrated on six large enterprises 
which produce 86% of the countries crude steel. In 
Ukraine seven companies contribute 88% to steel pro-
duction, while the market in Kazakhstan is dominated 
by the Temirtau steel plant that provides 80% of na-
tional production capacities. The interplay of strategic 
economic importance of the sector and high market 
concentration, plus weak democratic control structures, 
result in a high potential for rent-seeking and rent ex-
traction in that sector. Steel plant ownership matters.  
 
Figure 2: Main steel producing companies in the CIS 
countries 
 
 
 
Incentives for technological change in transition – 
the textbook case 
Steel production is not only merits for a country; it also 
causes dependency from input goods that are not 
available in every producing country – especially iron 
ore and primary energy carriers like high-quality coking 
coal and natural gas. In Ukraine, that has own coal 
deposits but depends on gas import from Russia, in 
recent years the iron and steel sector accounted for 
20% of total final energy consumption. Also, steel pro-
duction is a process that – depending on technologies 
used – can be extremely harmful for the environment 
and the health of the surrounding population. Thus the 
efficient use of inputs, control over emissions and 
hence technological progress in steel production was 
and is a concern not only of plant owners but also of 
governments world-wide. 
In transition countries, early stage hopes rested on 
privatization. A private owner per se was expected to 
upgrade the enterprise and to make it profitable as he 
was thought to be the “better entrepreneur”. Foreign 
investment should play a decisive role, since a foreign 
investor would be capable to introduce new technology 
together with the respective know-how. Pressure to 
upgrade technology would also come from trade liber-
alization – enterprises exposed to international competi-
tion would be forced to keep up technologically. Price 
liberalization and resulting increased prices of formerly 
subsidized inputs like energy would evoke efforts to 
diminish these costs by taking measures to replace 
production technology or to improve energy efficiency 
within existing production routes as it is the case in 
Europe (Flues / Rübbelke / Vögele, 2014). Environmental 
regulation can also be instrumented to promote techno-
logical change and technology adoption from abroad. 
However, under weak regulation and poor enforcement 
of rules, there will be no effect on technological pro-
gress; over time backwardness might even increase if 
foreign investors invest into the countries as in pollution 
havens.  
 
Incentives and Disincentives for technological change 
in Post-Soviet Steel  
Incentives for upgrading technology have indeed been 
high from the beginning of transition and intensified 
over years. All steelworks in CIS countries under con-
sideration have been fully privatized in the early years 
of transition; in most cases, they became vertically 
integrated into private holding companies. Supply 
chains that had existed in Soviet times disrupted, and 
enterprises had to import parts of their supplies from 
now foreign countries. Prices for many input goods 
saw price hikes, partly because they had to be im-
ported now and paid in hard currency, partly due to 
price liberalization, partly due to rising world demand 
for steel. Since 1998, the free-on board (fob) import 
price of iron ore saw a 10 fold-increase, the fob import 
price of hard coking coal a 7 fold-increase. This plays 
a role mainly for Ukrainian producers, but also for non-
integrated Russian mills. Energy prices rose substan-
tially, differing for countries and energy carriers. Addi-
tional pressure came with the 2008 financial crisis, 
because the steep fall in steel demand caused a fall of 
export prices. Taken together, these developments led 
to a severe decrease of profit margins in steelmaking, 
made smaller mills especially in Ukraine non-profitable 
(Vlasyuk, 2011) and brought some Russian steel-
makers to the edge of profitability. Incentives for either 
upgrading technology or pressure for market clear-
ance were high. 
Country
Kazakhstan
Russian
Fedaration
Ukraine
Company
ArcelorMittal
Evraz
MMK
Severstal
NLMK
Mechel
Metalloinvest
ArcelorMittal
Metinvest
Industrial Union
Donbass
Donezkstal
Zaporizhstal
Privat-Gruppe/
East-One
Foreign
Investor
yes 
(India)
no
no
no
no
no 
no
yes
(India)
no
no
no
yes 
(Russia)
no
 Market      
 share       
80%
18%
17%
17%
16%
9%
9%
15,5%
37,9%
20,9%
10,4%
9,6%
5,6%
Source: Own calculations based on: Fortescue 2011; Roland Berger
2012; annual financial reports of companies; for Kazakhstan and Russia
only informations about total revenues of the companies are avaliable.
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In contrast to market forces, environmental legislation 
which is the responsibility of governmental actors, did not 
contribute to stimulate change towards more efficient 
technologies. Inherited from Soviet times, there are nu-
merous pollution limits for the sector and its emissions 
and disposals. This end-of–the–pipe regulatory system 
persists till nowadays, but lacks efficiency: Pollution limits 
stayed nearly unchanged over decades, tariffs of fines 
did not cope with the pace of (hyper)inflation, and – most 
important – state capacities of monitoring pollution from 
stationary sources eroded together with the capacities 
(and partly the willingness) to collect fines. The Ukrainian 
Tax Code of 2010 introduced stepwise a tax on CO2 
emissions, but the amount of 0.2 UAH per ton (equal 
0.02 €) is simply too tiny to set incentives for change. A 
cap- and trade-system of CO2-emissions started with an 
experimental phase in Kazakhstan in 2013, however free 
allocated quotas reflected actual emission and hence 
also do not provide incentives for change. 
 
Technological (non)progress and environmental 
effects in CIS steel 
If we take specific energy consumption (energy con-
sumption per ton of steel produced) as an overall indica-
tor for technological change within the sector, we see 
that after 24 years of transition steel producing plants in 
CIS countries are still operating at much lower technical 
levels than in other countries. While Kazakhstan shows a 
major improvement in 1999 / 2000, Russia after 15 years 
is back at the starting point, while the data of Ukraine 
show high-efficiency at the beginning of transition fol-
lowed by a pronounced deterioration of energy intensity 
that casts doubts on data quality. The storyline of poor 
energy intensity performance of CIS steel thus holds 
over time as well as in comparison to other steel produc-
ing countries. In Russia and Ukraine, the expectations of 
technological change induced by transition obviously 
have not been met. 
 
Figure 3: Energy intensity in CIS steel production (GJ / ton), 
1995–2009 
 
While energy intensity provides first insights into tech-
nical change, it is not an ideal indicator if standing 
alone. Energy intensity in steel production depends 
not only on production technology and the operation 
control technology in place (re-use of by-product gas-
es etc.), but also on the caloric content of primary en-
ergy carriers used, the product mix, the type of iron 
ore and coal used and their material efficiency. The 
biggest efficiency differences result from the input 
used – the production of primary steel that uses iron 
ore as input can be up to three times more energy 
intensive than the production of secondary steel that 
uses scrap as input. A complete decomposition of 
energy consumption that accounts for differences of 
technical specifications in the steel sector in our case 
is limited by obvious weaknesses of energy data quali-
ty, the low disaggregation level of these data, and the 
poor information on input and production routes avail-
able for the countries of interest.  
 
Figure 4: Where are we now? Crude steel production by 
process (2011) 
 
 
Thus, to determine closer the technological progress 
made in steel production we have to limit ourselves to 
a descriptive look on available data of shifts in produc-
tion technologies product mix – but we should keep in 
mind that those shifts alone do not provide information 
on how technologically efficient and up-to-date these 
changes have been. Data on production technologies 
as published by the WorldSteel Association show that 
outdated and extremely energy intensive Open Hearth 
Furnaces (OHF) which consume by average 5 GJ / t 
more energy than Oxygen Blown Converters (OBC) 
are still widely used in Ukraine (which demonstrates 
clearly that energy consumption must be much higher 
than reported to IEA) as well as in Russia, while Ka-
zakhstan switched completely to the use of OBC with 
the demonstrated tremendous effects on energy inten-
sity. With respect to product mix, Kazakhstan has the 
most pronounced shift since it completely switched 
from ingot production to continuously cast steel. Esti-
mated differences in energy consumption between 
these two techniques show a huge variation form 0.34 
GJ / t to 5.5 GJ / t, so efficiency gains directly attribut-
able to that switch are not clear. 
Source: IEA, Steel Statistical Yearbook, own calculations; The ex-
treme low values for Ukraine demonstrate a problem with energy con-
sumption data reported to IEA by Ukrainian authorities that lead to a
systematic underestimation (IEA 2007, 106); Ukrainian sources report
about 24 GJ/ton (Metallurgprom); Data before 1995 have been ex-
cluded due to inconsistencies and obvious misspecifications in re-
ported consumption data.
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Environmental effects of technological backwardness 
Technological backwardness has clear effects on 
emission intensity of the sector that is one of the “dirti-
est” industrial sectors. Air pollution directly attributable 
to an enterprise can be observed within a radius of up 
to 100 km. Air pollutants are mainly CO, SOx, NOx 
and particulates (dust and fine particles, including 
heavy metals), but also CO2 from fuel combustion. The 
older the technology used, the more sulphur contained 
in (unfiltered) energy carriers used, the more stock-
piles of iron ore and coal kept on open grounds, the 
older the transportation technology used, the more 
energy used in sintering (to name only some exam-
ples) the more pollutants are emitted. The sector also 
discharges large volumes of contaminated water that 
had been used for cooling coke or steel; water con-
tamination also stems from leaching of rainwater 
through piles of raw materials or through accumulated 
solid wastes. Heavy metals, oils and greases are re-
leased to local water streams and underground water. 
Solid wastes produced in the sector can be recycled to 
a large percentage – if the necessary technologies are 
in place. If recycling rates are high, hazardous wastes 
play a minor role. 
Data on pollution stemming from the sector in CIS are 
rare and not consistent over years and countries. While 
all enterprises have to register their emissions in envi-
ronmental passports that include their individual pollution 
limits, neither these data nor actual pollution from the 
sites are available to the public. The Russian Yearly 
Report on the Environment discloses only aggregated 
information of industrial pollution. The “Development 
Strategy of the Metallurgical Industry till 2020” in 2009 
stated that the sector contributes 28% of industrial emis-
sions; if the technical base is modernized, emissions will 
be reduced by more than 50%. It also states that in case 
of modernisation pollution will not exceed (timely set) 
limits in 2011 – thus indicating that this is not the case 
without modernisation. In Kazakhstan, where environ-
mental information is structured alike, statistics show that 
the city Temirtau which is a steelwork mono-city, and the 
region Karaganda where the downstream coalmines are 
located, are among the most polluted places of the coun-
try. According to a textbook of 2005 dust emissions by 
steelworks are 2–6 times higher than limits set (Panin 
2005). In Ukraine, the National Reports on the Environ-
ment since 2010 include a separate chapter on the met-
allurgical industry, but systematic information on emis-
sion intensity is missing. All big enterprises of the sector 
are among the 100 dirtiest of the country. The National 
Reports state that the equipment of the sector is ex-
tremely outdated and therefore environmental damage is 
extreme. Due to low energy efficiency, the sector in 2011 
accounted for more than three quarters of industrial CO2 
emissions, with emission intensity rising. NOx emissions 
also rose at a higher pace than production. A serious 
concern comes from more than 22 Mio tons of non-
recycled hazardous wastes that are stored at the territory 
of the enterprises and then transported to partly “unor-
ganized” landfills – a problem that is prevalent in Ka-
zakhstan as well. 
The role of ownership in CIS steel 
The analysis of ownership and technological change in 
CIS steel shows results that are somewhat puzzling. 
Privatization and market pressure should have in-
duced technological change in all three countries si-
multaneously – but as we observed technological 
change was very limited in Russia and in Ukraine, 
whereas pronounced in Kazakhstan. In Kazakhstan, a 
foreign owner took over. In Russia steel plants are 
owned nationally (we treat ownership in tax havens 
like Cyprus as national), there was technological pro-
gress but energy efficiency stayed unchanged. In 
Ukraine, where we have mixed ownership (tax havens 
are treated equally), plant owners due to their de-
pendency from imported inputs should have had the 
highest incentive to introduce new technologies and 
partially did so, but they are still using the most back-
ward technologies on average and overall efficiency is 
unchanged. If steel plants in Ukraine and Russia are 
really working at the edge of profitability then they 
should either disappear from the market or restructure. 
Our assumption is that national steelmakers can rely 
on protectionist measures and subsidies so that there 
is no pressure for them to restructure.  
 
Figure 5: Ownership structure of largest steel producing 
companies in CIS 
 
 
 
The numerous EU anti-dumping investigations and the 
scope of measures taken – up to 35% extra ad 
valorem duties on different steel products had been 
raised against Russian and Ukrainian steelmakers in 
different investigations since 2006 – demonstrate that 
dumping in this industry is a matter of fact. By that 
time, it were mostly subsidized prices for gas (Russia) 
and gas plus electricity (Ukraine) that had raised con-
cern of EU producers. Due to the non-cooperative 
behaviour of steel plant owners in disclosing account-
ing and other information to EU bodies, other factors 
had been practically out of reach when calculating 
applicable margins. However, besides cheap energy, 
numerous other protective measures have been taken 
by CIS governments, culminating in the aftermath of 
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Source: Own calculations based on: Fortescue 2011; Roland Berger
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only informations about total revenues of the companies are available.
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the 2008 crisis. In Ukraine the tariffs for railroad fright 
for iron and steel products have been frozen, as well 
as the tariffs for electricity and gas for the sector (till 
March 2010). In Russia, the governmental Anti-Crisis-
Program 2009 provided financial support and access 
to cheap credits not only for banks, but also for “sys-
temic” enterprises of the steel sector, as well as for the 
whole steel value-chain like car manufacturers and the 
defence industry. 
 
Figure 6: Steel Oligarchs and their influence on politics 
(Ukraine) 
 
 
 
But these open accessible (albeit not transparent) 
measures might in fact play only a limited role. If we 
examine plant ownership in detail, it becomes obvious 
how deep national plant owners in Russia and Ukraine 
are involved into politics. The so-called “Oligarchs” 
(Guriev / Rachinski 2005) as a matter of fact are among 
the richest men of their countries. In Ukraine, plant 
owners are seemingly split between the two ruling 
political parties. While this might rise hope that subsi-
dizing practices might be revealed by competitors and 
hence stay limited, political history of Ukraine shows 
that this is not the case: Before elections, oligarchs 
played both sides and after elections even changed 
sides to secure their positions in an opportunistic 
manner rather than disclosing insider information to 
the public. State capture – influencing the rules of the 
game – thus can be played without control of external 
observers or independent media. Examples are nu-
merous and reach from public procurement (e.g. for 
pipeline infrastructure), tax loopholes for steel holdings 
across borders or not-enforced tax payments to envi-
ronmental damage caused but not attributed to the 
polluters. If CIS steelworks had to internalize these 
effects, to apply Best Available Technolgies and to 
keep the limits set in the EU Industrial Emission Direc-
tive, production of most enterprises would become 
unprofitable. 
 
Figure 7: Steel Oligarchs and their influence on politics 
(Russia) 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Expectations that “the market” would solve the problem 
of inefficient and dirty steel production in CIS have not 
been met. Oligarchic structures that emerged after priva-
tization are in no need of technological progress as long 
as their enterprises are subsidized and protected by their 
governments. While modern governments stimulate 
technological change and move towards a post-carbon 
development path, CIS governments still act as if uncon-
strained by energy resources and environmental factors. 
Since European policy makers are concerned by price-
dumping of importers and environmental issues alike, 
technological efficiency and environmental aspects of 
production should be considered in anti-dumping investi-
gations and the design of trade agreements. A border 
adjustment carbon-tax as discussed by now will not be 
enough to capture these aspects and to overcome the 
locked-in situation within CIS countries. 
Country
Metinvest
75% SMC
20% Smart
Holding 
Industrial
Union 
Donbass
Donezkstal
East-One 
(Interpipe)
Privat 
Group
Largest
owner(s)
R. Akhmetov
V. Novinskiy
V. Hajduk
S. Taruta
O. Mkrtchan
V. Nusenkis
V. Pinchuk
I. Kolomoysky
H. Boholjubow
O. Martynov
Estimated
wealth in bln
(US-$, 2011)
9,83 
3,12 
n/a
n/a
n/a
1,78 
3,16 
6,52 
6,36 
2,14
Political influence
• preferential treatment in privatization
  process of steel plant (reversed by 
  Timoshenko government)
• Connected with Party of Regions (MP
  2006–2012, donations) and its politicians
  (e.g. B. Kolesnikov, vice prime minister 
  2010–2012) 
• Influence on media through own media 
  holdings
• Loyality of adminstrations of Kuchma, 
  Yuschenko and Yanukovych towards 
  Novinsky
• Supporting Orange Revolution (Tymos-
  henko, Yushchenko)
• Support of former attorney general of 
  Ukraine Gennady Vasilyev
• One of the “founding fathers” of Donetsk
  financial-industrial group with current 
  members of parliament
• preferential treatment in privatization 
  process of steel plant (reversed by 
  Timoshenko government) 
• Son-in-law of former president Kuchma 
  (1994–2005)
• Owner of various companies in the 
   media sector
• Member of parliament 1998–2006
• Larger distance to politics since Orange 
  Revolution
• Supporter of prime minister Y. Timos-
  henko until elections 2010
• Owner of various companies in the 
  media sector
• Faced with governmental pressure 
  since 2010
Country
Evraz
MMK
Severstal
NLMK
Mechel
Metallo-
invest
Largest
owner(s)
R. Abramowicz
A. Abramow
A. Frolow
V. Rashnikov
A. Mordashov
V. Lisin
I. Zyuzin
A. Usmanov
(50%)
A. Skoch 
(30%) 
V. Anisimov
(20%)
Estimated
wealth in bln
(US-$, 2013)
10,2
  4,2
  n/a
4,2
12,8 
14,1 
1,8 
17,6 
7,9 
2,9
Political influence
• Member of Parliament and governor of
  Chukotka Autonomous Disctrict 
  (2000–2008) (Abramowicz)
• Preferential treatment in privatization 
  process
• Close ties to former Ministry of Industry
  and Energy (2004–2012) Viktor Khristenko
• Supporting Putin in 2000 presidential 
  elections 
• Supporting Putin in 2004 presidential 
  elections
• Member of advisory board of Ministry 
  of Industry
• Close ties to V. Kozhin: Head of the 
  Presidential Property Management 
  Department of the Russian Federation 
• 2008/2009: conflict with local authorities
  and public criticism of Mechel announced
  by Prime Minister V. Putin
• chairman of Gazprominvest Holdings
• owner of media holding (Kommersant), 
  purchase according to Kremlins strategy?
• Close ties to former KGB personnel that
  is closely connected with V. Putin
• Member of parliament since 1999 (among
  others: United Russia); chairman of advi-
  sory council on metallurgy (2000–2003)
• n/a
 
Inside Oligarchs versus Outside India 
 
 
 
Policy Issues No. 1 March 2014 | 6 
Literature 
Flues, Florens, Rübbelke, Dirk and Vögele, Stefan 
(2014): Energy Efficiency and Industrial Output: The 
Case of the Iron and Steel Industry. ZEW Discussion 
Paper No. 13-101 
Fortescue, Stephen (2011): Die russische Stahlin-
dustrie und die Ukraine. In Ukraine-Analysen (86). 
Online verfügbar unter: http://www.laender-analy-
sen.de/ukraine/pdf/UkraineAnalysen86.pdf, letzter 
Aufruf 20.03.2014. 
Guriev, S., Rachinsky, A. (2005). The Role of Oligarchs 
in Russian Capitalism. Journal of Economic Per-
spectives. Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 131–150. 
International Energy Agency IEA (2007). Tracking In-
dustrial Energy Efficiency and CO2 Emissions. 
OECD / IEA. Paris.  
Panin, M. S. (2005): Ekologija Kazachstana, Semipala-
tinsk, Gosudarstvennij Pedagogisceskij Institut, Se-
mipalatinsk. 
Vlasyuk, V. S., State Agency of Ukraine for Manage-
ment of State Corporate Rights and Property: Global 
Market and Ukrainian Steel Industry Development. 
Presentation held at the 70th Session of the OECD 
Steel Committee Meeting, Paris, 12–13 May 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abouth the authors: 
Manuela Troschke: IOS Regensburg 
http://www.ios-regensburg.de/personen/mitarbeiterinnen/ 
manuela-troschke.html 
Florian Wittmann: Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, 
University of Regensburg 
http://www.osteuropastudien.uni-muenchen.de/ 
personen/studierende/2012/wittmann/index.html 
